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Showing posts from August, 2012

Response to “Society Does Not Make Gender” by Dr. Larry Young and Brian Alexander

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"A queer symbol of new gender image" by Finnish artist Susi Waegelein At the beginning of August, Ruth Padawer published a piece in the New York Times magazine about gender non-conforming children and parents. Last week, Dr. Larry Young of Emory University and science writer Brian Alexander (who are publishing a book together, The Chemistry Between Us ) published a response to the article , in which they argue, essentially, that gender is biologically hardwired into the brains of fetuses by the organizational effects of hormones. They go on to implicitly endorse what has been called the “brain sex theory” of transgender identity/behavior. According to this theory, hormones organize the sex/gender of the brain much later than they organize the sex/gender of the genitals, allowing for a discordance to develop between the two ( Bao 2011 ). Admirably, Young and Alexander use the brain sex theory to argue for an acceptance of gender non-conforming children. They write, “so rath

Experimental Ethics: An Even Greater Challenge to the Doctrine of Double Effect

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In his article Neuroethics: A New Way of Doing Ethics, Neil Levy (2011) argues that “experimental results from the sciences of the mind suggest that appeal to [the Doctrine of Double Effect] might be question-begging.” As Levy frames the Doctrine, the Doctrine is a moral principal that is meant to ground the intuitive moral difference between effects that are brought about intentionally versus those that are merely foreseen. More specifically, the Doctrine is supposed to ground the intuition that, when certain conditions are met, it is morally permissible to bring about a bad outcome that is merely foreseen, but, under these same conditions, it would not be morally permissible to bring about a bad outcome intentionally. Or, another way to put this, the Doctrine claims that it takes more to justify causing harm intentionally than it takes to justify causing harm as a merely foreseen side effect (Sinnott-Armstrong, Mallon, McCoy, & Hull, 2008). The intellectual roots of the Doctrine

Welcome Our Newest Neuroethics Scholar!

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It is with great pleasure that the Emory Neuroethics Program announces its newest neuroethics scholar : Riley Zeller-Townson! The Neuroethics Program invited graduate students to create and to join collaborative, interdepartmental faculty teams at Emory and in the Atlanta community to pursue Neuroethics scholarship.  Graduate students were free to propose projects of interest to them. Proposals included innovative ideas in the arena of teaching, empirical research, new media, and beyond. By the completion of their one year appointments, each scholar is expected to co-author a paper and present his or her work.  The selection process was quite competitive. The abstract of Riley’s proposed project and a short bio can be found below. Riley Zeller-Townson (Neuroethics and Art) Riley Zeller-Townson For my Neuroethics Scholars Program Fellowship, I will be studying, as well as participating in, the interaction between Neuroethics and Art.  This includes documenting and analyzing ethical issu

Finding and Naming (Symptom) Constellations

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By Guest Contributor Racheal Borgman, MA   DSM IV-TR via Wikipedia.org The rhetorical component of illness is an important extension to the issues raised in last month’s post on the DSM . As Anjana Kallarackal pointed out, there are concerns aplenty when it comes to the DSM and how the committee goes about its categorizing work. But I was especially interested by the very first response to the post, by David Nicholson : "I wonder if it would be useful to try to put a number to the "negative consequences" of a given addiction… If we could decide how damaging some addiction was, maybe that would tell us how much to medicalize it as well. Insurance companies could decide that they'd cover cognitive behavioral therapy for internet addiction, but nothing beyond that." It’s an incredibly tempting solution. But then there’s the pesky rhetorical component of illness that must be contended with. For instance, how do we: know that an illness is an illness? know that a p

The Military and Dual Use Neuroscience

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If there’s one thing I learned from the most recent installment of Christopher Nolan’s Batman trilogy, it’s this:  if you’re doing interesting research, it probably has a military application. In the interest of spoiler avoidance, let's just call this Wayne Enterprises invention "dual-use." (http://ixpower.com/2012/07/dark-knight-rises-batman-movie-does-infant-smr-industry-no-favors/) Dual Use Technology The formal name for it is “dual-use technology,” and it’s difficult to find an area of research in which it’s not a relevant concern. Innovations in renewable energy may avert catastrophic global warming, but they also promise to significantly lower military fuel costs and improve the mobility of forces newly unconstrained by the logistics of fossil fuel transportation. Research into nuclear fusion foreshadows essentially inexhaustible carbon-free energy at the same time as it provides a  technological foundation for fusion-triggered nuclear weapons that some believe

Comment on: Placebo for Psychogenic Illnesses: Why “It’s all in my head” does and doesn’t matter

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*This post was originally posted on the Neuroethics Women (NEW Leaders) Leaders site . Recently, I composed a piece for Nature Science Soapbox entitled, Placebo for Psychogenic Illnesses: Why "It's all in my head" does and doesn't matter and in the Huffington Post on Placebo . Both pieces work to reframe and deepen our understanding of medicine and illness by utilizing neuroscience. Importantly, this process must include humility for the limitations of neuroscience and our current understanding of the brain while also maintaining an openness to what we don't know, avoiding foreclosing opportunities for richer understanding of the brain's capabilities. I believe neuroethics discourse needs to occur with all relevant stakeholders, and as I discussed with colleagues recently, I feel it would be a failure if I couldn't engage in neuroethics discourse outside of my discipline (I admit that I'm well-rooted in neuroscience). I've had colleagues voice conc

Brain Connectomes: Your ticket to the future

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Science often provides us with thrilling and puzzling scenarios in which our imaginations are forced to conceive the possibilities the future may bring. Life after death is an old concept that is getting a facelift. The Connectome, a very real development in neuroscience, is being used to conceptualize another very interesting piece of science-[fiction]: mind uploading . Image from http://www.mindcontrol.se/?attachment_id=3021 Fast-forward a few centuries. Bear with me, as this requires imagination. You have just died and are beginning the journey to the next stage of your life. For this trip, you won’t have to pack any bags. If all goes smoothly, you will be back home in time for the evening sitcoms. Your casket was lowered into the Earth this morning and because your driver’s license indicated ‘Continue Life’ you are scheduled for resurrection this afternoon. Suddenly, a message appears. There are three ticket options for you today. Our Elite ticket (1 million USD) and our most comfo