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By Ross Gordon In their recent paper on neuroenhancement, Brian Earp and his colleagues draw a distinction between “functional enhancement [and] enhancement of well-being,” arguing that the former, dominant construction cannot deal with the ways in which welfare is often enhanced by functional diminishment. On these grounds, the authors propose a “ welfarist ” paradigm, which defines enhancement as “any change in the biology or psychology of a person which increases the chances of leading a good life in a given set of circumstances.” On one level, I think Earp's welfarist approach both clarifies debates about enhancement and usefully broadens the set of interventions that could be understood as “enhancing.” On another level, however, I think his discussion of welfare begs a set of far more crucial questions: namely, what does it mean to talk about a “good life,” what “given set of circumstances” exist, and what is the relationship between individual welfare and broader social stru...

By Richard Ashcroft, MA, PhD Professor Richard Ashcroft teaches medical law and ethics at both the undergraduate and postgraduate level in the Department of Law at Queen Mary, University of London. Previously, he was Professor of Biomedical Ethics in the School of Medicine and Dentistry, and before that he worked at Imperial College London, Bristol University and Liverpool University. Professor Ashcroft is Co-Director of the Centre for the Study of Incentives in Health, funded by the Wellcome Trust, with partners at Kings College London and the London School of Economics.  He is also working on the role of human rights theory, law and practice in bioethics policy, and on ethical challenges in public health. He has a longstanding interest in biomedical research ethics.  I am both someone who writes and teaches on bioethics, and father of a son with autism.  He’s a delightful and happy child and he and I have good lives. But like most parents of children with autism I do wo...